General Discussion

Tomorrow’s briefing on resolution 2231 will be the first to take place since the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia have contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to activate the mechanism and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. At that point, resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.

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At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief Council members on the Secretary-General’s report, which notes that diplomatic efforts by JCPOA members and the US to achieve a negotiated solution to Iran’s nuclear programme were suspended following the military escalation between Israel and Iran from 13 to 24 June and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities by the US on 21 June. Diplomatic activity resumed in August and September, but these engagements “did not succeed in identifying a way forward satisfactory to all parties involved”. The report subsequently describes letters that the parties have sent to the Secretary-General to convey their respective positions on later developments during the reporting period.

The report also refers to the latest quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This report, dated 12 November, describes serious and ongoing challenges to the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards in Iran following the June hostilities involving Iran, Israel, and the US. The report notes that the IAEA temporarily halted verification activities and withdrew inspectors for safety reasons. It adds that, although the “Cairo agreement” announced by Iran and the IAEA in September established procedures for resuming inspections consistent with the Safeguards Agreement, Iran did not provide a required special report on the status of nuclear material and facilities affected by the attacks. As a result, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge over Iran’s previously declared inventories, including significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, which it has been unable to verify for several months—a situation that the report describes as “a matter of serious concern”.

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Tomorrow, Council members such as France, the UK, the US, and others who requested the meeting may express concern about the IAEA report’s findings. They may echo the BoG resolution’s call on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency in accordance with the country’s safeguards obligations and to account for the status of its nuclear facilities and stockpile of highly enriched uranium. These members are also likely to reiterate their position that the snapback mechanism was properly invoked, giving legally binding effect to all previous UN sanctions; restoring the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its PoE; and maintaining the Council’s 2231 architecture. In this context, they may urge the swift operationalisation of relevant institutional bodies through the appointment of a Committee chair as well as a new 2231 facilitator—a position that has been vacant since the end of Slovenia’s term in this role in October. Additionally, while emphasising their longstanding position that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, these members may stress their continued preference for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and call on the country to resume bilateral negotiations with the US on a new agreement to succeed the JCPOA.