Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
Editorials & Other Articles
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
The collapse of Assad's regime shows the limits of Russian airpower
Russia’s airpower may win tactical victories, but as seen in Syria, it fails to deliver long-term strategic success, offering lessons for Ukraine.
Ibrahim Al-Marashi
Associate professor at California State University, San Marcos
After a decade-long civil war, Bashar al-Assad was firmly ensconced in Damascus — a far cry from the summer of 2012 and again in 2015, when policymakers, analysts, and pundits alike believed his rule was on the brink of collapse. The intervention of the Russian Air Force in the fall of 2015 saved the al-Assad regime.
Yet, its sudden collapse on Dec. 7 highlights a key lesson: airpower can achieve tactical victories but not long-term strategic ones. This offers a glimmer of hope for Ukraine. Al-Assad lost because he couldn’t survive sanctions, and Russia’s bombing didn’t break the people’s resistance — two lessons with direct implications for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, Syria has been the only case of a Soviet/Russian-provided military arsenal — originally designed to achieve strategic parity with Israel — being turned on its own population. Yet, by 2015, the Syrian government was at its weakest, unable to break a stalemate. The state had secured the north-south axis from the capital along its coastal spine, while the Kurds consolidated control over their territory. However, Aleppo was outside government control, and ISIS was on the offensive.
In May 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Russia to restart negotiations. The stalemate of 2015 had set in, and this would have been the most opportune moment for the Syrian state to feel pressure to pursue a negotiated political resolution. But instead, Russia’s decision to intervene in fall 2015 ensured that al-Assad would not negotiate from a position of weakness. The Russian intervention was not about supporting al-Assad out of devotion to Syria’s president per se, but about dictating the outcome of a negotiated endgame, including a politically expedient way for al-Assad to step down on Russia’s terms.
https://kyivindependent.com/the-collapse-of-assads-regime-shows-the-limits-of-russian-airpower/
Ibrahim Al-Marashi
Associate professor at California State University, San Marcos
After a decade-long civil war, Bashar al-Assad was firmly ensconced in Damascus — a far cry from the summer of 2012 and again in 2015, when policymakers, analysts, and pundits alike believed his rule was on the brink of collapse. The intervention of the Russian Air Force in the fall of 2015 saved the al-Assad regime.
Yet, its sudden collapse on Dec. 7 highlights a key lesson: airpower can achieve tactical victories but not long-term strategic ones. This offers a glimmer of hope for Ukraine. Al-Assad lost because he couldn’t survive sanctions, and Russia’s bombing didn’t break the people’s resistance — two lessons with direct implications for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, Syria has been the only case of a Soviet/Russian-provided military arsenal — originally designed to achieve strategic parity with Israel — being turned on its own population. Yet, by 2015, the Syrian government was at its weakest, unable to break a stalemate. The state had secured the north-south axis from the capital along its coastal spine, while the Kurds consolidated control over their territory. However, Aleppo was outside government control, and ISIS was on the offensive.
In May 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Russia to restart negotiations. The stalemate of 2015 had set in, and this would have been the most opportune moment for the Syrian state to feel pressure to pursue a negotiated political resolution. But instead, Russia’s decision to intervene in fall 2015 ensured that al-Assad would not negotiate from a position of weakness. The Russian intervention was not about supporting al-Assad out of devotion to Syria’s president per se, but about dictating the outcome of a negotiated endgame, including a politically expedient way for al-Assad to step down on Russia’s terms.
https://kyivindependent.com/the-collapse-of-assads-regime-shows-the-limits-of-russian-airpower/